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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

MARY AMELIA WOOD, HAZEL
STEVENS, LLOYD WARNER Guardian at Litem for Nancy Louise
Ovard, WAYNE JOHN STERLING
and DEAN J. HADFIELD,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

9541
No.

vs.
WALTER L. BUDGE, Attorney
General of Utah,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by the Attorney General, Walter L.
Budge, from the judgment and mandate of the District Court
of Salt Lake County ordering him to pay certain moneys to
plaintiffs and respondents.
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
The District Court of Salt Lake County had granted respondents' petition for writ of mandamus and issued a writ
con1pelling the defendant and appellant, Walter L. Budge,
Attorney General of Utah, to pay thetn the sums appropriated
for their benefit by the Utah Legislature.
RELIEF SOUGHT
That the judgment and mandate of the District Court be
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts set forth by appellant is substantially correct. However, respondents disagree with certain
things therein set forth and feel that certain other material
facts are omitted.
Appellant asserts throughout his brief that the claims of
plaintiffs and respondents were denied by the Board of Examiners. This is not so. The fact is that the Board of Examiners,
after it examined each claim, merely transmitted it to the
Legislature with the recommendation that the claim be denied.
R. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 40, Finding of Fact No. 5, and, Exhibit D-2.
It is important also for this Court to consider the following
additional facts clearly evidenced in the record but which were
not set forth in the Statement of Facts of appellant: That no
part of these claims had ever been paid by the State (R. 39);
that the State of Utah is immune from suit (R. 39); and,
that the Attorney General did issue an opinion concerning the
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applicability of Article VII~ Section 13 of the Utah Constitution, which fact, however, has no materiality or relevancy
to this appeal.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE ONLY PROPER AND ADEQUATE REMEDY
AVAILABLE TO PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS WAS
MANDAMUS.
POINT II
NO REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED JUSTIFIED THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REFUSAL ·To PAY THE CLAIMS
OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS.

POINT III
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE BOARD
OF EXAMINERS TO CCEXAMINE ALL CLAIMS" IS A
PREREQUISITE TO BUT SUBORDINATE TO THE SOVEREIGN POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO ((PASS UPON'' CLAIMS.
POINT IV
LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS APPROPRIATING
MONEY IN A GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT TO
SATISFY CLAIMS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE THE EN-
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ACTMENT OF A PRIVATE LAW GRANTING ANY
PRIVILEGE, IMMUNITY OR FRANCHISE TO AN INDIVIDUAL, ASSOCIATION OR CORPORATION AS PROI-IIBITED BY THE CONSTITUTION.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ONLY PROPER AND ADEQUATE REMEDY
AVAILABLE TO PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS WAS
MANDAMUS.
The Appropriation Act of 1961, H.B. No. 282, Chapter
185, Laws of Utah, 1961, appropriated money to the Attorney
General for the benefit of plaintiffs and respondents and
directed the Attorney General to pay them upon their signing
releases prepared by the Attorney General. Plaintiffs and
respondents offered to sign such releases. The only action
required of the Attorney General then was the purely ministerial act of handing the vouchers to them. (See Petition for
Writ of Mandamus, paragraphs 5 and 8, R. 2; Answer, paragraph 1, R. 16; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
paragraphs 6 and 9, R. 40).
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly indicate that
mandamus '\vas the appropriate remedy in such a situation by
providing in part in Rule 65B (b) (3) as follows:
(((b) Grounds for Relief. Appropriate relief may be
granted:

* * * *
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( 3) Where the relief sought is to compel any
* * * * person to perform an act which the
law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office; or to compel the admission of a
party to the use and enjoyment of a right
* * to which he is entitled and from which
he is unlawfully excluded by such * * *
person; * * ."
The only thing which was required of the Attorney
General was a mere ministerial act, and plaintiffs and respondents, by the Appropriations Act, were clearly entitled
as of right to receive payment but were unlawfully excluded
therefrom by the Attorney General.
It is provided in 55 C.J.S. 206 that:

(( * * * Mandamus

will lie to compel the attorney
general to perform a ministerial duty, * * *. In addition, it has been held that mandamus will lie in cases
where there is no other adequate remedy.''
See also 34 Am. Jur. 922 providing in part that:

(( * * *

If the act sought to be coerced is purely
ministerial, the attorney general having no discretion
or right to exercise his judgment in the matter, the
writ may issue against him * * ."
In his brief the Attorney General asserts at page 7 that
((there is a serious question * * * whether the Attorney General
has the right to pay claims * * * denied by the Board of Examiners and subsequently approved by the Legislature," which
question ((should be resolved by the courts" and "this is the
only erason why he has refused to pay the claims."
In the first place, the Attorney General is wrong 'vhen
he asserts that the claims of plaintiffs and respondents were
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denied by the Board of Examiners. (See Statement of Facts
in Respondents' brief). In the second place, if the Attorney
General is sincere, why did he force plaintiffs and respondents
to bear the trouble and expense of bringing an action against
him? He could have brought some other remedy himself. Since
he claims to be interested only in clearing up the legal questions
involved, why does he question the propriety of a mandamus
proceeding which will effectively determine the legal questions
involved?

POINT II
NO REASONABLE. INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED JUSTIFIED THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REFUSAL TO PAY THE CLAIMS
OF PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS.
In his Points II, III, IV and V the Attorney General
asserts that the Utah Constitution vests great power in the
Board of Examiners with reference to claims but that these
powers are not clearly defined. There is no argument but that
the Board of Examiners does have great powers. He then
asserts at page 8 that the Constitution creates a Board of
Examiners with power ''to exa1nine, consider and act upon
claims ... (Emphasis supplied). Article VII, Section 13 of the
Utah Constitution, contrary to what the Attorney General
asserts, merely provides in part:
n

* * * the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney-

General shall constitute a Board of Examiners, with
power to examine all claims against the State * * * .'·
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The Attorney General then endeavors to torture the word
"examine" to mean plenary power to dictate. See for example
his statement at pages 16 and 17 of his brief where he says:
"To allow the Legislature to pass claitns which have previously
been denied after careful scrutiny by the Board, or to disallow
claims which have been allowed by the Board, is not only an
intereference with executive discretion, which does violence
to the whole conception of the separation of powers, but also
relegates the Board to a mere auditing body." His contention
is that the Legislature has no discretion of its own with reference to claims but can do only what the Board of Examiners
dictates. With due deference to the Attorney General we are
•
''
emunable to go along with him that the word cc examtne
braces such all inclusive power.
In the case of Bateman v. Board of Examiners, 7 Utah
2d 221, 322 P. 2d 381, this Court had occasion to consider
the powers of the Board of examiners as contrasted with the
powers of the Board of Education. The Court had to decide
whether the Board of Examiners or the Board of Education
had superior power in controlling salaries and personnel practices of the Board of Education. The decision of the Court
was in favor of the Board of Examiners based on the fact
that the ultimate power of State government was in the Legislature, which, by statute, had vested the power in question with
the Board of Examiners. In the course of its decision this
Court said:

**

Certain it is that one of the functions of
Examiners is to investigate and act as a fact finder
and advisor to the legislature on claims of that nature,
such as tort claims, or other claims for damages or
n
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con1pensation claimed for property, goods or services,
by persons who would not otherwise have legal redress
available." (Emphasis supplied).
The Attorney General as chief legal officer of the State
of Utah must certainly have been conversant with the fundamental and universally recognized principle involving the
powers of state government that any restriction on the powers
of the Legislature, which is the ultimate sovereign power of
the state, must be strictly construed. As set forth in 16 C.J.S.,
Constitutional Law ss. 7, page 203:
((A state constitution is construed strictly in favor
of the state, and as not divesting it or its government
of any of the prerogatives, unless the intent to do so
is clearly expressed, and, generally speaking, it should
be given a liberal and broad construction in favor of
the power of the legislature. So, while a constitutional
restriction or limitation is not to be construed so as
to nullify it, a provision limiting or restricting legislative power is strictly construed so as not to extend
the limitation beyond its terms and so as to favor the
power of the legislature."
As this Court pointed out in the Bateman v. Board of Examiners case supra, at page 385 of 322 P. 2d:

**

the fundamental power of government rests
in the legislature."
cc

It is difficult to conceive of any interpretation of the
word examine" which would support the position of the
Attorney General that the constitutional power conferred upon
the Board of Examiners to ccexamine" claims gives the Board
of Examiners power to dictate to the Legislature and make
the Legislature in essence a ccrubber stamp" of the Board of
cc
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Examiners. When the word nexan1ine," as used in the Utah
Constitution, is interpreted in accordance with generally applicable rules of constitutional construction, no such interpretation would justify the position taken by the Attorney
General.
POINT III
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE BOARD
OF EXAMINERS TO ((EXAMINE ALL CLAIMS" IS A
PREREQUISITE TO BUT SUBORDINATE TO THE SOVEREIGN POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO ((PASS UPON" CLAIMS.
Plaintiffs and respondents are well aware that this Court
has held the State may not pay a claim until it has first been
submitted to the Board of Examiners. It has never been held,
however, that the power of the Board of Examiners to ((examine'' claims confers upon the Board of Examiners the power
to proscribe the action which the Legislature may take in
((passing uponn claims.
In the early case of Thoreson v. State Board of Examiners,
21 Utah 186, 60 P. 582, aff'g. 19 Utah 18, 57 P. 175, a case
\vhere the Legislature had enacted a law directing the Board
of Examiners to pay the claims of lessees of state school lands
for the money they had paid under void leases, this Court
held that the duty of the Board of Examiners to receive, audit
and allow the claims under that law was mandatory and not
discretionary. It should be particularly noted that the Legislative enactment in the Thoreson case directed the Board of
Examiners to pay those claims even though they had never
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previously been submitted to the Board of Examiners. This
Court said in the course of its opinion in 60 P. at page 582:

* * * mandamus

lies to enforce the performance
of that ministerial duty * * * .''
tt

The holdings in State v. Edwards, 33 Utah 243, 93 P. 720,
and Uintah State Bank v. Ajax, 77 Utah 455, 297 P. 434, are
only that before a claim against the State may be paid it must
first be submitted to the Board of Examiners.
The Supreme Courts of three other states having constitutional provisions similar to that of Utah conferring power
upon the Board of Examiners to "examine" claims have interpreted such power as not superior to the power of the Legislature.
The Nevada Constitution, Article V, Section 21, reads
exactly like Article VII, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution,
providing in part that:
"The governor, secretary of state, and attorneygeneral shall constitute * * * a board of examiners
with power to examine all claims against the state

*** ,
This was the earliest adoption of such a constitutional
provision by any state, having been adopted by Nevada in
1864, which pre-dated the adoption of the similar Utah constitutional provision by approximately thirty years. At the
time of the adoption of the Utah Constitution, the Supreme
Court of Nevada had already had occasion to interpret the
above - quoted provision of its Constitution and, since
Utah adopted this particular provision of the Nevada Constitution after it had been interpreted by its Supreme Court,
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the framers of the Utah Constitution are presumed to have
adopted it as it had been interpreted by the Supreme Court
of Nevada.
In the case of State ex rel Ash v. Parkinson, 5 Nev. 15
(Jan. 1869), the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the
institution of the Board of Examiners was not intended as a
check on legislative extravagance, but to secure, as a prerequisite to legislative action, an examination of claims against
the state. The Supreme Court of Nevada said:
((The defendant contends that this section imposes
the action of the Board of Examiners as a jurisdictional
pre-requisiet to any legislative action upon any real
or assun1ed claim against the State. * * * One premise
of the position is, that the section creates the Board
of Examiners as a check to legislative extravagance.
* * *. The Board of Examiners was intended to subserve an important purpose, but not that one which
defendant insists. That it prescribes a prerequisite to
to legislative action is true * * * and for that reason
can apply only to such claims as require legislative
action upon them as claims-not creative action but
adoptive or rejective action."

*

*

*

*

((The section, as has been said before, confers no
power save that of examination upon the Board, there
being no power of adjudication conferred, why not
the Legislature, the ultimate tribunal, act without
previous examination, that examination being of no
binding force? While none of these considerations
render it clear that the required pre-requisit~ of examination is of form rather than of substance, nor
that the section, so far as the Legislature is concerned,
is directory and not mandatory, yet it is impossible to
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decide the contrary without a reasonable doubt. Such
doubt existing, under the well-established rule of law,
the statute cannot be declared unconstitutional, even
as to the point now in question.''
In the case of State ex rel Lewis v. Doren, 5 Nev. 399,
the Supreme Court of Nevada pointed out that the power of
the Board of Examiners with reference to the legislature was
only advisory and stated:

* * * when that instrument

(the Constitution) empowers the Board of Examiners to examine all claims,
he (the Auditor) must exercise his power subject to
such examination. What is this examination? Confessed! y, by the words used, and as admitted by counsel
on the argument of this case, with reference to the
Legislatttre, only advisory." (Emphasis supplied).
lC

*

lC

*

*

*

* * such power is neither idle nor nugatory. It may

and probably does materially assist both the Legislature
and Controller. It serves to give a fuller airing and
ventilation of claims, than might or probably would
follow one examinatoin-and to that extent, throws
additional restraints and safeguards around the treas-

ury. "

* * * *
* * * the investigation

is double, consequently
more searching and protective."
lC

With reference to the State of Montana, in the case of
State v. Erickson, 75 Mont. 429, 244 P. 287, the Montana
Legislature made appropriations for specific purposes and the
Board of Examiners attempted to scale down these appropriated
funds. The Supreme Court of l\1ontana in denying the Board
of Examiners this power stated:
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cc

* * * Such attempted substitution of the judgment

of executive officers for that of the legislative body
constitutes a usurpation of legislative functions which
cannot be permitted under our constitutional division
of state government into its three co-ordinate departments * * * ."
See also Mills v. Stewart, 76 Mont. 429, 247 P. 262, and,
State ex rel Schneider v. Cunningham, 39 Mont. 165, 101 P.
962.
Idaho also has a constitutional provision relating to the
power of the Board of Examiners like that of Utah. The
Attorney General in his brief at page 13 states that the Idaho
Supreme Court has in substance ruled that the power of the
Board of Examiners is c cabsolute'', citing the case of Gem
Irrigation District v. Gallet, 43 Idaho 519, 253 P. 128 (1927).
The cited case does not so hold as a careful examination of
that case will reveal. In that case the Legislature had made an
appropriation and pursuant to that appropriation the Board
of Examiners had allowed a claim which the Auditor had
refused to pay. A writ of mandamus was brought to force the
auditor to pay the claim. The question with which the Supreme
Court of Idaho was therefore concerned was not a question
of the power of the Board of Examiners versus the Legislature
but a question of the power of the Board of Examiners and
the Legislature versus the Auditor. In disposing of the matter
the Supreme Court of Idaho said:
((The state board of examiners having allowed the
claim, it was the auditor's duty to honor its action,
unless he found the act authorizing such allowance
invalid * * * ."
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The Idaho Supreme Court said also at 253 P. at page 131 in
regard to the Legislative Act:

(( * * * the Legislature has determined that the state
shall receive its quid pro quo. The state gives nothing;
it lends nothing; it recognizes and discharges a moral
obligation for past benefits accrued and of necessity
further to accrue. The sole object of th~ act was the
creation and maintenance of a public use. Whether
or not the Legislature acted wisely is beside the issue.
It had the constitutional right to do as it did * * * ."
The case of Rich v. Williams, 81 Idaho 311, 341 P. 2d
432, was a mandamus action against the State Auditor to
compel him to pay claims for the construction of a building
for which an appropriation had been made by the Legislature.
In the course of its decision the Supreme Court of Idaho said:
((We therefore hold that the claims involved in this
case must be first presented to the Board of Examiners
for examintion, as well as all other claims against the
Highway Fund, 'excepting salary or compensation of
officers fixed by law,' as required by Idaho Const.
A rt. 4, ss. 18 * * * .,
"This does not mean, however, that the Board of
Examiners is vested with authority by either the Constitution or statute to override the expressed will of
the Legislature. By our Constitution the power to
make and determine policy for the government of
the State is vested in the Legislature, * * * .
((The Legislature having considered and determined
the necessity for the building authorized by Chapter 83,
and that its construction is in the interest of the people
of the State, and having by the enactment of said
Chapter approved the project by appropriating funds
for its construction, the Board of Exan1iners is without
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power to veto the act, or reverse the policy thus declared, by refusing to approve valid claims properly
presented, in execution thereof. As to such claims, the
authority of the Board of Examiners is limited to determining that the claims are in proper form, properly
certified to the State Auditor by the Department of
Highways, and chargeable against the appropriations."
In the case of Padget v. Williams, ____ Idaho ____ , 350 P.
2d. 353, the Supreme Court of Idaho again had occasion to
consider the power of the Board of Examiners with reference
to a claim which the Board of Examiners had refused to pay.
The Supreme Court ordered the claim paid stating in the course
of its opinion:
ccln support of his motion made at the meeting of
the board of examiners on February 26th, the attorney
general cited a number of prior decisions of this court.
All of these decisions have been heretofore considered
by the court, a number of them being cited in Rich
v. Williams, supra, and in this case. All but two of
them were cited by the attorney general in the briefs
submitted by him in these two cases. In so far as any
of those decisions may be in conflict with the decision
in Rich v. William.r or the decision herein, the same
are hereby overruled * * * " (Emphasis supplied.)

*

*

*

*

CCThe absurdity of the attorney general's contention,
and of any recognition by this court of the authority
which he claims for the state board of examiners,
become apparent when fol~owed to its logical conclusion * * . In short, the attorney general's contention
is reduced to the absurdity of an attempt to confer upon
the state board of examiners power to overrule the will
of the legislature, and to render nugatory any legislative act providing for the carrying on of any function
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of the state government which requires the expenditure
of money.
ttT rue, the board of examiners is a constitutional
tribunal, with the constitutionally vested power to
examine all claims against the state. But, nevertheless,
it is also only an arm of the executive department of
the state government. The authority now claimed would
make it the supreme authority in state government,
with power to control or nullify the acts and functions
of all three of the major departments of the state governnzent- executive, legislative, and }udicial. Such
power, the constitution does not confer upon it. The
power to examine all claims against the state does not
extend that far * * ." (Emphasis supplied).
The aforesaid expressions by the Supreme Courts of all
the states having constitutional provisions similar to Utah
decisively establish that while the Board of Examiners has
great powers, its powers are subordinate to those of the Legislature.
This fact is even more clearly so in Utah. The Utah
Constitution is unique in that the provisions establishing the
Board of Examiners is prefaced with the phrase ((until otherwise provided by law." Respondents respectfully submit that
the Utah Legislature can completely abolish the presently constituted Board of Examiners. This being the case, it is utterly
ridiculous to contend, as does the Attorney General, that the
power of the Board of Examiners with reference to claims
is superior to the power of the Legislature.
The Attorney General seeks to make much of the difference
tn the powers of the Board of Examiners in regard to nunliquidated" claims prior to a policy determination by the
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Legislature as opposed to ccliquidated" claims. Rsepondents
fail to see how their claim can be more ccliquidated" than in
the present case \vhere the Legislature, after hearings, made
a policy declaration to pay the same and specified the amounts
to be paid.
POINT IV
LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS APPROPRIATING
MONEY IN A GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT TO
SATISFY CLAIMS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE THE ENACT1v1ENT OF A PRIVATE LAW GRANTING ANY
PRIVILEGE, IMMUNITY OR FRANCHISE TO AN INDIVIDUAL, ASSOCIATION OR CORPORATION AS PROHIBITED BY THE CONSTITUTION.
In his argument under Point VI of his brief at pages 14 and
15 the Attorney General asserts that when the Board of Examiners has denied claims ccfor the reason that there is no legal
or moral obligation against the state," if the Legislature allows
those claims, ccit grants a special privilege immunity or franchise." May we point out again that the Board of Examiners
never denied these claims. The record shows conclusively that
the Board of Examiners transmitted each claim to the Legislature merely ccwith the recotnmendation that the claim be
denied." The further statement by the Attorney General that
the claims were denied ccfor the reason that there is no legal
or moral obligation against the state" is purely a figment of
his imagination without a scintilla of evidence in the record
to support it.
The Attorney General paid many claims similar to those
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of respondents which the Board of Examiners had transmitted
to the Legislature with its recommendation that they be approved and many which the Board of Examiners had transmitted to the Legislature without any recommendation. The
Attorney General apparently would have us believe that when
the Board of Examiners transmits a claim to the Legislature
without recommendation or with its recommendation that it
be approved, a halo of righteousness is thus cast upon such
claim, so that it does not bear the stigma of private legislation
prohibited by the Constitution. If the Attorney General is not
serious in this ridiculous assertion, he is faced with the other
alternative of having knowingly paid out state money wrongfully pursuant to the terms of a statute which he contends is
invalid as being private legislation.
Respondents submit that the act of the Legislature in
making appropriations to satisfy claims against the State in
a General Appropriations Act is general and not special or
private legislation as prohibited by the Constitution. May it
be noted that the General Appropriations Act made provision
for payment for all members of that class who had claims
against the State and whose claims the Legislature determined
as a matter of policy should be paid. In 82 C.J.S. Statutes,
Section 163, page 273, it is provided as follows:

(( * * * The test of whether a

statute so operating
falls within constitutional limitations and inhibitions
on the right to enact special or local legislation becomes,
ordinarily, the propriety of the classification resorted
to by the legislature. Although the class must be legitimately constituted, it is competent for the legislature
to classify objects of legislation. It has a large discretion
in this respect, and, if the classification is reasonable, or
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in accordance with the judicial decisions on the question
is natural, and appropriate for the occasion, is single
and not a double or reclassification, is not artificial
or arbitrary, unjust or capricious, and rests on some
substantial difference or situation or circumstances
inc..~:ating the necessity or propriety of legislation restricted to the class created, it will be upheld."
Only by such legislation can the State meet its moral obligation
to pay just claims against it.
In the case of Mills v. Stewart, 76 Mont. 429, 247 P. 332,
the Montana Legislature had made an appropriation to recompense a student who was injured on bleachers at a State University. In its decision holding the appropriaton valid the
Supreme Court of Montana said:
((We do not discover any provision of our Constitution which forbids the Legislature to assume liability
for injury resulting from the negligence of the State's
agent, whether the liability is assumed before or after
the injury occurs, and to say that the state may assume
such liability but may not discharge it is simply to
make the law ridiculous. United States v. Realty Co.,
163 U.S. 427, 16 S. Ct. 1120, 41 L. Ed. 215. Common
sense is the essence of the law, and that which is not
good sense is not good law.''
While as pointed out above, the Utah Act was a general
and not a special or private Act, the Supreme Court of Hawaii,
held that even a private act which the Legislature of Hawaii
had enacted making an appropriation to satisfy certain moral
claims was not in violation of its organic act prohibiting grants
of "special or exclusive privilege." In upholding the validity
of that Act the Court said:
((No one questions the right and power of the legis-
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lature to hold hearings for the purpose of eliciting
facts so as to make a determination of appropriate
legislative action. It does no more than that in the
enactment of legislation recognizing moral obligations
and necessarily so, since it alone possesses the power
to grant such relief. * * * the legislature is the keeper
of the State's conscience. It alone possesses the means
to salve that conscience. * * * ."
See Koike v. Board of Water Supply, City & Co. of Honolulu,
Hawaii, 352 P. 2d 835.
This Honorable Court has announced that any person
having a claim against the State, the settlement of which is not
otherwise provided by law, should present the same to the
Board of Examiners and to the Legislature. See H jorth v.
Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P 2d 907; Campbell Building Co. v. State Road Commission, 95 Utah 242, 70 P 2d 857;
Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626.
It would be the height of absurdity to recognize that a
person having a claim against the State, the settlement of which
is not otherwise provided by law, should present his claim to
the Board of Examiners and to the Legislature, and, then, to
hold that the legislative enactment making provision for the
payment of that claim is unconstitutional because it is private
legislation.

CONCLUSION
A careful consideration and analysis of the facts in this
case and the law applicable thereto demonstrates that the
Attorney General arbitrarily, capriciously and without right,
refused to pay respondents the sums appropriated to them
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by the Legislature as a valid and constitutional exercise of the
legislative power. The judgment and mandate of the District
Court that the Attorney General pay said claims forthwith
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
C. N. OTTOSEN
Attorney for May Amelia Wood
EDWARD F. RICHARDS
Attorney for Hazel Stevens
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON
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